This paper critically examines how risk-taking behaviors can be modeled from a decision-making perspective. We first review several applications of a decision perspective to the study of risk-taking behaviors, including studies that investigate consequence generation and the components of the overall utility (i.e., consequence, desirability, and likelihood) of risk-taking and studies that investigate the validity of two decision-oriented models (subjective expected utility and the theory of reasoned action) in predicting risktaking behaviors. We then discuss challenges in modeling risk-taking behaviors from a decision-making perspective. These challenges include (i) finding the factors that are necessary to improve the predictability of models, (ii) difficulties in eliciting the individual components of overall utility, and (iii) incorporating overall utility changes over time.
INTRODUCTION
Decision models such as subjective expected utility (SEU) were developed as stylized abstractions from real decision making under risk. Subsequently, the focus of much behavioral decision research has been on describing choices over simple monetary gambles and the focus of much prescriptive decision analysis research has been on how people should and do make generic decisions. Although there are many benefits of having elegantly simple and unified decision models, the drawback is that the models lack contextual realism. Thus, many decision-making practitioners have grappled with creating ad hoc procedures for describing and improving actual decisions. The health domain, especially risk-taking behavior, is an ideal context to reexamine the applicability of existing decision models because some key elements of health decisions are already incorporated in generic decision models but other features are not yet well modeled.
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Recently, partly due to the AIDS epidemic, the study of risk-taking behavior has received growing attention. Drinking and driving, risky sex, alcohol or drug use, smoking, and engaging in dangerous sports such as rock climbing have all been extensively studied. Although much research has been done on identifying factors (e.g., drug use) that are associated with a specific risk behavior, only a few studies have examined health risk-taking from a decision-making perspective. The fact that health risk-taking decisions involve complex processes may make it difficult to apply traditional decision models. Nonetheless, because of the potential life and death consequence of risk-taking, it is important to model such decision processes appropriately.
This paper examines the challenges in modeling risk-taking behaviors from a decision-making perspective. We first summarize two representative lines of research which have applied a decision-making perspective to study risk-taking behaviors, namely, investigating decision-making components of risk-taking and modeling the relationship between preference and behavior. We then examine several challenges in modeling risk-taking behaviors from a traditional decision perspective. These challenges include (i) identifying variables that need to be included in a model to accurately describe behaviors and (ii) difficulties in modeling risk-taking from a utility framework, including complexities in assessing each component of overall utility and those in modeling risk-taking over time.
PREVIOUS APPLICATIONS OF DECISION-MAKING PERSPECTIVES IN STUDYING RISK-TAKING BEHAVIORS
Traditional theories of decision-making state that a decision problem may be structured via several interactive steps. First, the problem must be identified and the possible courses of action must be considered. Second, for each action (or option), several components must be assessed to compute the overall utility of each option.
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The necessary steps to assess the several components of overall utility depend upon the nature of a problem. For a simple problem, these steps are (i) identifying the (possibly multi-attribute) consequences that may follow from each option, (ii) evaluating the desirability of each of these consequences, and (iii) assessing the likelihood of each of these consequences. Finally, the overall utility of each option is computed by combining desirability and likelihood according to some``combination rule,'' and the option with the highest overall utility is considered to be thè`b est'' option (Furby 6 Beyth-Marom, 1992; von Winterfeldt 6 Edwards, 1986 ). The most widely used combination rule of traditional decision-making is subjective expected utility (SEU), which states that overall utility is the sum of the product of the desirability and likelihood of each outcome (see Section 2.2.1 for a formulation).
Two approaches have been taken in applying the above-mentioned aspects of decision-making in investigating risk-taking behaviors. Based on the fact that overall utility is computed by combining desirability and likelihood of each of the generated consequences, one line of research has investigated individual or group differences in judging each component of overall utility and the implication of these differences on the intent to engage in risky behaviors. Another line of research applying a decision-making perspective to risk-taking behaviors has focused on rules by which the components of overall utility are combined, and has investigated the validity of such combination rules in predicting actual behaviors. The next subsection introduces some studies that are representative of each line of research.
Studying the Components of Overall Utility of Risk-Taking Behaviors
Among the components of overall utility consequence, desirability, and likelihood for modeling risk-taking behaviors, the processes of identifying the possible consequences of a given option and evaluating the likelihood of these consequences have been studied most extensively. In a typical study to investigate individual differences in identifying the possible consequences of a given option (e.g., engaging in a specific risky behavior), subjects are asked to list all the possible consequences, mainly framed as costs and benefits, of engaging in that behavior. For example, Beyth-Marom, Austin, Fischhoff, Palmgren, 6 Jacobs-Quadrel (1993) studied adolescents' decision-making by comparing the lists generated by adolescents of possible consequences of engaging or not engaging in risky behaviors with lists generated by adults. They found that both groups generated more negative than positive consequences of engaging in some risky behaviors, but equal numbers of positive and negative consequences of not engaging in those behaviors. Because teenagers generally engage in riskier behaviors than adults do, this result of no difference between groups is surprising. More work is needed to explain this apparent paradox.
The likelihood of each of the consequences of a given option is assessed typically on a rating scale. The association between the likelihood and the degree of intent to engage in a given option is then compared across positive and negative consequences. For example, Fromme, Katz, 6 Rivet (1997) found that likelihood ratings for positive consequences were more highly correlated with the intent to engage in risky behaviors than were those for negative consequences.
This approach has also been used to investigate the underlying linkages between alcohol use and risky behaviors. For example, Katz 6 Fromme (manuscript) examined whether alcohol consumption led to any differences in either the consequence generation or the likelihood estimation of several risky behaviors. They found that, for all subjects, positive consequences were rated more likely than negative consequences, and that the intoxicated group generated fewer negative consequences. Fromme, Katz, 6 D'Amaco (1997) found that subjects rated the likelihood of negative outcomes of engaging in risky behaviors as less probable when intoxicated than when sober. However, the results regarding subjects' intent to engage in risky behaviors were inconsistent between the two experiments: subjects indicated a greater likelihood of engaging in risky behaviors when intoxicated than when sober in one experiment, but indicated no difference in intent in the other experiment. A similar study is in progress by the first and third authors (Cho 6 Cooper) in collaboration with K. J. Sher at the University of Missouri, Columbia. In this study, we intend to test the interactive effects of alcohol and gender on the generation of costs and benefits related to risky sexual behavior and to drinking and driving, and on the evaluation of the desirability and likelihood of each consequence. In addition, we intend to use open-ended questions for consequence generation as in Beyth-Marom et al. (1993) to investigate individual differences on these components.
Two Decision-Oriented Models of the Relationship between Attitude and Behavior
The previous applications of a decision-making perspective in studying risktaking behaviors have focused on the individual components of overall utility. Another focus is on studying the relationship between attitude toward risks and actual behaviors. Models of decision-making propose rules to combine decision components to compute overall utility. The computed overall utility is a numerical representation of an individual's overall attitude for a given option, and individuals' choices can be predicted by comparing the utilities of the options. Thus, research that has applied a decision-making perspective in studying risk-taking behaviors has focused on testing models by investigating the accuracy of the computed overall utility in predicting risk-taking behaviors.
The two representative decision-oriented models that have been applied in studying the attitude-behavioral relationship of risk-taking behaviors are subjective expected utility theory developed by Edwards (1954) and the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen 6 Fishbein, 1980) . SEU is the most representative combination rule among traditional decision-making models. Although SEU was developed to explain choices between two or more options, it is often applied in studying the degree of association between the overall utility of a single option and actual behavior. The theory of reasoned action (TRA) was developed specifically to model the attitudebehavior relationship and proposes a combination rule similar to SEU.
Subjective Expected Utility
SEU is the most frequently adopted model in decision-making studies and it has also been applied in studying health risk-taking behaviors. The most extensive work on the validity of SEU in predicting risk-taking behaviors has been done by Bauman and his colleagues. They investigated whether SEU can accurately describe behaviors such as cigarette smoking (Bauman, Fisher, Bryan, 6 Chenoweth, 1984) , drinking (Bauman 6 Bryan, 1983) , and sexual behavior (Bauman 6 Udry, 1981) . For example, Bauman 6 Udry (1981) investigated the relationship between adolescents' SEU utility index evaluations of sexual interactions and their actual sexual behaviors in a cross-sectional study. The overall utility of sexual interaction was computed by the sum of the products of the desirability and the probability.
Utility of sexual interaction=:
where p i =probability of consequence i, selected out of a fixed inventory and measured on a 5-point scale, and u(consequence i)=desirability of consequence i measured on a 4-point scale.
Subjects' sexual behaviors were measured (a) by whether they had sexual intercourse and (b) by the degree of intimate sexual interaction. Bauman 6 Udry (1981) found that the higher the SEU score, the more likely an adolescent had engaged in sexual intercourse and other intimate sexual behaviors.
To study the predictive validity of the SEU index on future risky behaviors, Bauman (1980) studied the relationship between the SEU (termed``utility index'') for marijuana use and subsequent behaviors in a one-year-interval longitudinal study. When Bauman also weighted the product of the desirability and likelihood of each consequence by the degree of matching between time-delay of consequence and individuals' time-orientation, the results showed a significant positive correlation between the resulting SEU index at Time 1 and the frequency of marijuana use at Time 2 for both users and nonusers at Time 1.
As pointed out by Furby 6 Beyth-Marom (1992) and Sutton (1987) , a limitation of the series of studies by Bauman and his colleagues is that they only evaluated the SEU of engaging in a behavior and did not evaluate the parallel SEU for not engaging in the behavior. Based on the SEU model, risk-taking behavior should occur when the overall utility of engaging in that behavior is higher than the overall utility of not engaging in the behavior. Thus, the overall utility of both actions should be measured (cf. Sutton, 1987; Beach, Campbell, 6 Townes, 1979) .
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA)
From the social psychological perspective, Ajzen 6 Fishbein (1980 , Fishbein 6 Ajzen, 1975 proposed the theory of reasoned action to explain behaviors that are under``volitional control.'' They argue that behavior is a function of intention (I), which in turn is determined by two factors, attitude toward the behavior (A b ) and subjective norm (SN), i.e.,
where w 1 and w 2 are weights; A b is a function of a person's beliefs (b i ) and evaluations (e i ) for certain outcomes, and SN is a function of a person's beliefs about social norms (nb j ) and his motivation (mc j ) to comply with them. The mathematical form for attitude toward a behavior (A b ) of the TRA is the same as SEU where beliefs are equivalent to subjective probability and evaluations to desirability. However, the numbers of beliefs (or events) considered are different between the two theories. In principle, although not in practice, the SEU theory assumes that all the possible events need to be considered whereas the TRA assumes that only salient beliefs need to be considered (Ajzen, 1996) . Whether societal norms should be treated separately from attitude as in TRA or they can be best incorporated in the process of evaluating desirability remains to be studied.
Numerous studies have tested the descriptive validity of the theory of reasoned action (refer to Eagly 6 Chaiken, 1993, for a summary). The model was tested in terms of the multiple correlation predicting intention from weighted attitude and subjective norm, and the single correlation predicting behavior from intention. Sutton (1987) summarized the studies that applied this theory to predicting drug use intentions and behaviors. He reported that overall, only 38 0 of the variance (correlation=0.62) in intention was explained by attitude and subjective norm. The simple correlation between intention and behavior varied dramatically across studies, ranging from 0.04 to 0.84. In a more recent review of the meta-analysis by van den Putte (1991), Ajzen (1996) reported that the average multiple correlation predicting intention from attitude and subjective norm was 0.68 and the average correlation between intention and behavior was 0.62. Thus, he concluded that TRA has been reasonably well supported.
Extending Basic Models to Include Self-Efficacy

Self-Efficacy and the Theory of Planned Behavior
Because the TRA assumes that most behavior is under volitional control, it cannot be applied to behaviors that violate this assumption. For example, many smokers know that quitting will reduce the chances of lung cancer, but they may nevertheless feel incapable of stopping. An individual's perception about how easy it would be to stop smoking should have considerable impact on whether or not he or she tries to quit smoking. In the context of avoiding risky behaviors, self-efficacy can be defined as an individual's perception of his or her ability to initiate or sustain a specific precautionary behavior (Bandura, 1986, p. 391) .
The theory of reasoned action was modified partly to incorporate the concept of perceived behavioral control (PBC), or self-efficacy. The new version is called the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985 (Ajzen, , 1991 . Using the same notation as above, the theory of planned behavior states that PBC interacts multiplicatively with intention, i.e.,
where c represents control belief and p represents perceived power of the particular control factor. Thus, according to this theory, behavior also depends on the degree of PBC. In general, the inclusion of perceived behavioral control has been shown to substantially improve the prediction of both intentions and behaviors (e.g., Madden, Ellen, 6 Ajzen, 1992; Ajzen, 1996) .
Self-Efficacy and SEU
How self-efficacy can be best incorporated in SEU models of risk-taking behavior is unclear. Some aspects related to self-efficacy can be reflected in generating the advantages and disadvantages of engaging in a specific behavior. For example, a person may start to smoke because of high self-efficacy for quitting. It is also possible that self-efficacy might be reflected in likelihood estimates of various consequences. A given consequence may be rated as not that probable partly because an individual does not feel confident to implement the necessary behavior. Whether self-efficacy can be accurately reflected in consequence generation or altered probabilities (or both) or whether it should be kept separate, remains to be answered (Weinstein, 1993, p. 328) . As an example of the latter, Eiser 6 Sutton (1977) incorporated the concept of``confidence,'' defined as``the subjective probability of succeeding given that an attempt is made,'' into SEU to model the decision to try to quit smoking. They found that the inclusion of confidence better explained attempts to quit smoking.
CHALLENGES IN MODELING RISK-TAKING BEHAVIORS
In the previous section, we describe (i) how the components of the overall utility of risk-taking have been studied, (ii) two representative models for aggregating the components of overall utility to predict behaviors, and (iii) the incorporation of self-efficacy into models to improve predictive validity. Since risk-taking has practical importance for health decisions, it is important to develop models that are descriptively accurate and have predictive power. However, to accomplish this goal, decision-oriented models should be carefully examined and modified, if necessary, to accurately represent the complex nature of risk-taking behaviors. In this section, we discuss several challenges in modeling risk-taking behaviors.
One challenge is to identify additional necessary or sufficient factors that have not been incorporated in previous models. It is another challenge that seemingly important variables for predicting other behaviors may not be sufficient for predicting risk-taking behaviors. Below, we introduce a study that tests whether perceived likelihood of a negative outcome and the prior experience of negative outcomes are sufficient factors to reduce future sexual risk-taking. The second challenge is how to elicit individual components of overall utility accurately. Although relevant studies are rare in the area of risk-taking, many related studies exist in the areas of medical decision-making and behavioral decision-making. We will cite studies from these areas and consider their implications for studies of risk-taking. The third important challenge is to model decision-making over time. In that context, we discuss discounting of future outcomes and decaying of the effects of the present situation, and the importance of change of reference level.
Identifying Necessary Factors that Contribute to the Positive Relationship between Attitude and Behavior
Although it has been demonstrated that behavioral intentions, as a function of many factors proposed by SEU and TRA, can explain a significant proportion of the variance in behavior, many studies also have shown that additional variables can improve predictive validity. A theory which incorporates more variables than SEU and TRA is the theory of general behavior (Triandis, 1977 (Triandis, , 1980 . In addition to perceived consequences and values of these consequences, this theory also includes affect, social factors (including social norms, personal norms, and interpersonal agreements to engage in a certain behavior), habits, facilitating conditions in environmental conditions, and physiological arousal. In the theory of general behavior, intention was formulated as a function of affect, perceived consequences, values, and norms. As in SEU and the TRA, Triandis (1980; also see Lauver, 1992 , for a summary) proposed an aggregation rule for combining these variables.
The additional variables that are needed to improve the sufficiency of a model in predicting behavior can be classified into two categories. One category includes factors that would be expected to predict behavior directly without interacting with attitude. Impulsivity might fit into this category. Another category contains the factors that might moderate the relationship between attitude (or overall utility) and behavioral intention or between behavioral intention and behavior. Situational factors such as alcohol use or sexual arousal might fit into the latter category. Selfefficacy as discussed above could fit into either category.
Another challenge in modeling risk-taking behaviors is the fact that whether these variables are both necessary and sufficient depends on the behavior to be studied. For example, Lauver (1992) eliminated the physiological arousal variable in the Triandis model to explain secondary prevention behavior such as seeking care for cancer symptoms. Another variable which has received extensive attention in the study of risk-taking behavior, especially for behaviors that become habitual or addictive, is past behavior or what Triandis called``habit.' ' Bentler 6 Speckart (1979) proposed a modified version of the theory of reasoned action in which the additional variable of past behavior affects both behavioral intention and behavior itself. Sutton (1987) found that adding previous cessation attempts explained more variance in smokers' decisions to try to quit. However, it is questionable whether all past behaviors become habitual or addictive (Sutton, 1987) .
One of the practically important aspects in studying risk-taking behaviors is to understand factors which lead risk takers to take preventive actions over time. A variable which has received extensive attention in the study of risk-taking behavior is perceived vulnerability to future negative outcomes.
3 The hypothesis that if a person feels highly vulnerable to risk, the person will be more likely to take a precautionary behavior has been the fundamental assumption underlying several models attempting to explain the adoption of health-protective behaviors (Becker, 1974; Maddux 6 Rogers, 1983) . Empirical tests of this assumption, however, have shown that perceived vulnerability may not be a sufficient factor when negative outcomes are severe (e.g., AIDS) and adopting precautionary behaviors involves complex decision-making (see Weinstein, 1993 , for a summary). In the next subsection, we introduce an example which investigates longitudinally whether two factors perceived likelihood of experiencing negative outcomes in the future and the experience of negative outcomes in the past are necessary and sufficient for changes in sexual risk-taking.
3.1.1. Modeling the Relationship Among Perceived Vulnerability, Negative Outcome, and Precautionary Behavior over Time
We introduce a study which is in progress by the first and third authors using latent variable analysis (refer to Pedhazur, 1997 , for the advantages of using latent analysis). Because it is possible that along with other factors negative outcomes experienced as a result of risk taking may affect individuals' risk perceptions, risk behaviors, or both, our model also investigates the direct effects of prior negative outcomes on later behaviors. One version of the longitudinal models is presented in Fig. 1 (refer to Cho 6 Cooper, in preparation, for detailed discussion). Following conventions, the latent variables of perceived vulnerability, precautionary behaviors, and negative outcomes are represented by circles and the manifest indicators of each of the latent variable are represented by squares. The general model of a latent analysis consists of two sets of linear equations, one for the structural model (e.g., T2 vulnerability=a* T1 vulnerability+b* T1 risky behavior+ c* T1 negative outcome+error) and another for the measurement model (e.g., T1 vulnerability=d * T1 riskstd+error), where T1 riskstd represents perceived vulnerability of getting a Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD), and a to d are parameters (see Bollen, 1989 , pp. 319 323, for a comprehensive explanation of the general model).
In this study,``perceived vulnerability to STD and AIDS'' was assessed on a 7-point Likert scale by a relative likelihood judgment and``risky sexual behaviors'' were assessed with two items assessing the number of partners and number of risky sexual practices, such as having sex with a stranger. Negative outcomes were assessed by the number of STDs (including AIDS) experienced. The model allows one to test a set of relations by controlling other factors. For example, if the correlation between perceived vulnerability at T1 and risky sexual behaviors at T2 is not significant, then the result would support previous results: For serious negative outcomes and complex preventive behaviors, risk perception is not a sufficient factor for taking precautionary behaviors.
Difficulties in Eliciting the Components of Overall Utility of Risk-Taking
Previous studies of risk-taking behaviors from a decision-making perspective have computed overall utility as a product of the sum of the independently measured desirability and likelihood rating for each consequence. Because multiple rather than single consequences were assessed in the process, the studies in essence estimated a very simple kind of multi-attribute utility rather than the purported single-attribute-based SEU.
4 However, these studies did not assess three necessary features in computing multi-attribute utility. Because it is important to clarify what components need to be assessed to accurately estimate the multi-attribute utility of risk-taking, we first point out the three features.
5 We then discuss the difficulties involved in assessing the components of the overall utility of risk-taking. The three features are as follows.
First, the list of consequences needs to be exhaustive. Thus, for example, in Bauman 6 Udry (1981), the summed products of the desirability and likelihood of each consequence of sexual risk-taking should have included the consequence of not getting pregnant as well as the one of getting pregnant.
Second, because a specific consequence of risk-taking behaviors may or may not occur, this uncertain nature should be incorporated in the estimation of the desirability of each consequence. However, the previous studies did not assess the desirability under uncertainty. We later describe several scaling methods and discuss which methods would be the more promising techniques for eliciting desirability of a consequence of risk-taking.
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Third, because each consequence is not mutually exclusive, several consequences need to be considered simultaneously. The consequences of sexual risk-taking, for example, may include getting pregnant, contracting HIV, retaining a relationship, etc. Such consequences should be modeled as the levels of multiple attributes which comprise each possible outcome of the decision. For example, one outcome can consist of contracting HIV and becoming pregnant and another outcome can consist of contracting HIV and not becoming pregnant. Thus, the multi-attribute desirability of an outcome of both contracting HIV and becoming pregnant should have been estimated by taking the weighted sum of the desirability of each of the two consequences. However, the previous studies implicitly weighted each consequence equally and did not assess the relative importance weight of each attribute (see Keeney 6 Raiffa, 1976 , for details on assessing weights in multi-attribute utility models).
Although these features have not been properly assessed in the previous studies, they are necessary for the accurate assessment of the overall utility of risk-taking. We discuss in the next section the difficulties in eliciting components of the overall utility of risk-taking assuming that all of these components are to be assessed.
Identifying Attributes for Evaluating Options
Several issues arise in constructing list of attributes to be evaluated. The first issue is how to generate the relevant attributes which may not be the same across situations, across individuals, or both. For example, Beyth-Marom et al. (1993) asked subjects to create their own list of costs and benefits associated with engaging in several risk behaviors. Although this method has the advantage of preserving individual differences, it makes group comparisons difficult. To study group differences, Beyth-Marom et al. (1993) combined the generated consequences into one of four types: personal effects, social reactions, effects on others, and specified behaviors. This procedure not only limits external validity of the study due to subjective judgments in the categorization processes, but also is labor intensive. Edwards 6 Barron (1994) argued that, for cross-group comparisons, it would be important to construct a list with which all value elicitees agree. However, constructing a general inventory may obscure individual or situational differences. For example, Katz 6 Fromme (manuscript) studied the effect of alcohol on consequence generation and found that the intoxicated group generated significantly fewer consequences than a sober group. Furthermore, consequences in a general inventory that an individual ordinarily would not consider may lead an individual to reorient his or her desirability or likelihood estimation.
The second issue is that the numbers of attributes that need to be considered are large. For example, Bauman 6 Udry (1981) made a list of 54 consequences in their study of adolescents' decisions to engage in sexual behavior. Although the literature has suggested that generalizing a two-attribute utility function to the case of more than two attributes is straightforward, in practice some sort of simplification is always required to make the judgments feasible. Based on a famous study of shortterm memory capacity (Miller, 1956) , Froberg 6 Kane (1989a) suggested that no more than 9 attributes should be used for determining individuals' preferences among several health-states. In a decision aiding context, Keller 6 Kirkwood (1999) created 54 attributes of a decision to merge the two professional societies, ORSA and TIMS, but in preference elicitation, used only 14 higher level attributes by grouping related objectives. Edwards 6 Barron (1994) also suggested simplifying the number of attributes to fewer than 12 by applying an appropriate procedure such as combining related attributes. However, the impact of such simplification in predicting actual choice has not been systematically investigated.
Assessing Likelihood of Each Consequence of Risk-Taking Behaviors
Most studies mentioned earlier assessed the likelihood of each consequence in terms of respondents' degree of agreement or disagreement on an equal interval rating scale with an arbitrary range. However, for some cases (e.g., AIDS), the likelihood of occurrence is rare. Thus, the Likert scale may not be sensitive enough to capture the variability in likelihood estimations, resulting in overestimation (or underestimation). Linville, Fischer, 6 Fischhoff (1993) compared a Likert scale method and a direct probability estimation method in estimating respondents' perceived risks and concluded that direct probability estimation is more sensitive in discriminating differences among risks with low probabilities of occurrence. 
Assessing Overall Utility of Outcomes of Risk-Taking Behaviors
Even when the numbers of attributes are limited to a manageable size, eliciting the overall utility of each outcome involves additional complicated issues. In the previous studies of risk-taking behaviors, desirability of each consequence was elicited using a Likert scale. For example, Bauman and Udry (1981) rated the desirability of each consequence associated with sexual activities 7 on a scale from &2 to +2. Because a Likert scale does not incorporate multiple consequences and the uncertain nature of the problem that are intrinsic with consequences of risktaking behaviors, other methods need to be adopted. The next subsections introduce other scaling methods that have been extensively investigated in studies evaluating medical treatments or policy and discuss the more promising techniques for risk-taking behaviors.
Scaling methods. Many studies that aim to evaluate medical treatment or policy have extensively investigated different ways to evaluate health-status in terms of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). These studies have found significant divergence in the utilities obtained from different methods. In this section, we briefly summarize six different methods described in detail in Froberg 6 Kane (1989b; see also Torrance, 1986) , and review studies which compared the estimates from these methods.
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6 Triandis (1977 Triandis ( , 1980 has suggested using a 100 point scale in eliciting the likelihood of each consequence. For applications in nursing research, see Lauver (1992) .
7 Similarly, in a non-health example with certainty about levels attributes, Keller 6 Kirkwood (1999) used an arbitrary range from &2 to +2 to evaluate the values of attributes.
Rating scale (RS): This scale consists of a line with the best and worst outcomes as endpoints. Respondents place the desirability of a specific consequence at some point on the line relative to the two endpoints. Category ratings or a Likert scale are a variation of RS, where the line is equally divided into several sections and each section is assumed to have equal intervals.
Magnitude estimation (ME ): In this scale, the desirability of a target health-status is measured as a ratio (i.e., how many times worse or better) to the given standard health-status.
Standard gamble (SG): This method consists of two alternatives. For example, alternative 1 is to receive a treatment which leads to a probability p of being healthy or a (1& p) probability of dying and alternative 2 is to receive another treatment which leads to a certain health-state i (e.g., a chronic illness). The probability p is varied until a respondent feels indifferent in choosing between two alternatives, and at this point, p is the desirability of the health-status i. This method is used to measure an unidimensional utility in traditional studies of decision making under risk.
Time trade-off (TTO): This method was developed by Torrance, Thomas, 6 Sackett (1972). As in SG, TTO consists of two alternatives: a treatment to live for x years in a health-state i and another treatment to live y years in normal health, where x is fixed and y is varied until a respondent feels indifferent between the two alternatives. The desirability of health-state i is computed as yÂx.
Equivalence or person trade-off (PTO): This method compares a given number, x, of people in a healthy condition (a standard condition) to a y number of people in a specific unhealthy condition. Respondents are asked to estimate y to make the two conditions equal. This method is similar to magnitude estimation.
Willingness-to-pay: This method estimates preference by a willingness-to-pay for a specified degree of improvement in health with a given probability that improvement will occur.
Given several ways to measure utilities, the question is whether these methods provide a convergent estimate, and if not, which method is more appropriate for eliciting utilities of outcomes of risk-taking behaviors. The next two subsections discuss these questions.
Comparing the utilities elicited from several scaling methods. Several studies have compared the elicited utilities from different valuation techniques (e.g., Read, Quinn, Berwick, Fineberg, 6 Weinstein, 1984) . Froberg 6 Kane (1989b; see also Nord, 1992 ) reviewed these rating methods in terms of their reliability, validity, and feasibility. They reviewed studies which reported different reliability results and concluded that due to different types of reliability reported in the previous studies and different criteria used in testing reliability (e.g., a different time interval for test retest reliability), consistent conclusions could not be drawn. To compare validity, they reviewed studies which investigated the convergence of the results across several methods. The results showed that even though the correlations between methods were relatively high, the obtained scale values were not necessarily equivalent. In terms of feasibility, SG and TTO are more difficult to implement than RS and ME due to the embedded probability and lengthy procedures.
Most of the studies were devoted to comparing the valuation techniques and did not pay attention to understanding the reasons for divergent results. As an exception, Nord (1992) discussed the distinctive features of each method and suggested possible reasons for the divergent results: (i) differences in the response modes, i.e., SG, TTO, and PTO procedures are based on choice, whereas RS and ME are based on judgment, (ii) differences with respect to what is being valued, i.e., the effect of risk aversion in SG, time preference in TTO, and different time-duration, equity consideration and framing in PTO, and (iii) differences in the use of anchor points, particularly in RS.
Which scaling methods are better? When different methods produce different results, the most important question is which methods are better. Different studies recommend different methods as preferred ones (Nord, 1992, pp. 563 564) . Nord pointed out that the disagreement among studies in their recommendation was partly due to an ambiguity in the interpretation of the obtained utilities, which makes it difficult to find a common criterion to compare these methods. Nord recommended to interpret the obtained utilities as representing ordinal preferences so that the validity of a method can be tested by investigating whether the preference relations that are induced from one method provide the same ordinal relationships as those that are directly elicited. Thus, preference order from one method should not be reversed with a different method. Although most studies did not test for preference reversals, Nord (as cited in Nord, 1992) compared the preference order from RS with that from PTO and found a discrepancy between the two methods.
The preference-reversal phenomenon is extensively studied in traditional studies of decision making with a standard gamble (e.g., Lichtenstein 6 Slovic, 1973) , where the preference order between the two directly compared gambles was different from the order induced from respondents' judgments for the values of the gambles. Many theories have been developed to account for the discrepancy, but only a few studies have been devoted to investigating a way to measure the value of a gamble which provides the same order as a direct comparison. For example, Bostic, Herrnstein, 6 Luce (1990; Cho 6 Luce, 1995) adopted a psychophysical method called Parameter Estimation using Sequential Testing (PEST) to estimate a certainty equivalent of a gamble with monetary outcomes. Cho 6 Fisher (1997) systematically tested the order-preserving property between PEST-induced preference order and that from direct choice, and found that for 40 680 of the responses, the preference order was reversed.
However, it is questionable whether the test of order preservation can be a good criterion for the content validity of a scale. Cho 6 Fisher (1997) argue that even if a scale provides biased estimates, the preference order can be preserved if the bias occurs systematically in one direction. Thus, a more direct test is necessary to verify whether the obtained estimates correctly represent the subjects' preferences. For example, once the probability is estimated with a SG, the gamble with the estimated probability can be represented with a sure outcome (e.g., a certain illness) to confirm whether subjects feel indifferent in choosing between the gamble and a sure outcome.
Best scaling method for eliciting overall utility of outcomes of risk-taking behaviors. Among the six scaling methods, only SG estimates utilities of uncertain outcomes. Furthermore, the SG, TTO, and PTO procedures measure utilities via a choice task, whereas RS and ME, which are currently the most frequently used methods in estimating the overall utility components of risk-taking behaviors, measure the utilities via a judgment task. Because the chance that outcomes of risk-taking behaviors will occur is uncertain and the theoretical formulation of utilities is based on choice responses, SG seems to be the most appropriate method to elicit utilities. However, in terms of feasibility, SG is difficult to implement because the procedure of estimating equivalence via repetitive choices is time-consuming. The problem becomes more complicated for multiple-attribute assessments. Thus, systematic studies for investigating an appropriate method to elicit utilities of outcomes of health risk-taking are needed.
Assessing the Relative Weights of Multiple Attributes
When modeling risk-taking behaviors using a multi-attribute utility function, once the set of attributes is determined, the relative weights of these attributes have to be determined. Clemen (1990) discusses the use of lotteries to assess weights in multi-attribute decisions under probabilistic risk. He also presents two methods pricing out and swing weights which are designed for multi-attribute decisions under certainty. Remaining questions are whether these methods can be appropriately applied in eliciting relative weights of attributes of risk-taking behaviors that occur probabilistically, how reliable various estimation procedures are, and which estimation methods provide better weights (see Keeney 6 Raiffa, 1976; Leo n, 1997; Borcherding, Eppel, 6 von Winterfeldt, 1991; Edwards 6 Barron, 1994) . 
Challenges in Modeling Behavior over Time
The basic decision-oriented theories we have discussed above compute a single number (overall utility or behavioral intention) by combining several factors associated with risk-taking behaviors. One implicit assumption in the basic theories is that the aggregation rule in the model of a person's decision behavior remains constant over time. Although the aggregation rule does not change over time, the levels of some of the factors do, such as changes in probabilities, resulting in changes in utilities. Health risk-taking studies are often longitudinal and when the time interval between the measurement of utility and the measurement of actual behavior is relatively long, often up to several years, it is questionable whether utility can adequately predict future behavior. A study by Christensen-Szalanski (1984) illustrates dynamic inconsistency in preferences over time. They found that most women chose to avoid anesthesia during labor pains when their preferences were measured one month before and after the labor, but they preferred to use 275 DECISION-MAKING AND HEALTH RISK-TAKING BEHAVIORS anesthesia when asked during the labor itself. Findings such as these suggest that the decision-oriented models of risk-taking behaviors need to be extended to fully model such changes over time. We will next discuss possible model extensions that would more formally incorporate dynamic changes including (1) discounting of future outcomes andÂor decaying of the effects of current interventions and (2) explicitly modeling changes from a reference level. When a teenager considers engaging in a risky behavior, both the present situation and the future will likely be considered. In choosing whether to smoke marijuana at a party, for example, consequences far in the future such as potential longterm harm to mental reasoning capacity may be discounted. Similarly, if a teenager is exposed to an anti-drug advertisement now, the effects of that advertisement are likely to decay as time passes. In Bauman's (1980) longitudinal study of marijuana use, he found that discounting the desirability of delayed consequences compared to immediate consequences improved prediction of subsequent marijuana use.
Results from other areas on what discount rates people appear to be using could be incorporated into longitudinal studies oh health risk-taking behaviors. Chapman 6 Elstein (1995) found that, unlike the standard assumption in financial decision analysis that a constant annual discount rate should be used to discount future outcomes to net present value, discount rates for medical treatment were larger than those for monetary-related decisions. They also found that observed discount rates were inversely related to the magnitude of the outcome and to the length of the delay. 10 Redelmeier 6 Heller (1993) also found that annual health discount rates for long delays were lower than rates for short delays and that discount rates for adverse health states such as depression were low. However, Rose 6 Weeks (1998) did not find differences in annual health discount rates for one year and ten years in the future.
A typical example of a behavioral change over time is a discontinuation of a protective behavior that a person had earlier adopted. Such behavior might be modeled by having the effect of the intervention decay exponentially over time. Some recent work in marketing of decaying effects of promotions on sales may be applicable here. McCaul, Glasgow, 6 O'Neil (1992) studied the effect of health education, skills training, and self-monitoring on the adoption of dental protection measures. They found that the interventions were effective during the study but two or more months later the effects had apparently decayed, because people did not maintain their protective behaviors.
CHO, KELLER, AND COOPER
Reference Level
Individuals' judgments about risk-taking behavior may change according to the conditions to which they refer, i.e., the reference level. Ask teenagers about how their dating relationship are going and the response may refer to a current level (``OK for now''), to the future (``things will be better next month''), to a change (``things are going worse''), or to a difference from expectation (``things are much worse than I expected''). In Christensen-Szalanski's study, women's preference changes for or against use of anesthesia during birth labor pains might be partially explained by changes in reference levels caused by changes in the amount of pain involved with birth.
Although it is clear that the reference conditions which individuals compare with a new status are important to understand the dynamic nature of risk-taking decisions, there is no shared agreement in the literature on what the operational definition of reference level is and how to measure it. The few studies that have investigated reference level used different terminologies and operational definitions. In one health risk-taking study, Maisto, Connors, 6 Sachs (1981) constructed a reference level model using expectation about the future effect of alcohol during alcohol consumption as the reference level. For psychophysics, Helson (1964) used a term``adaptation level'' to describe``internal norms representing the pooled effects of present and past stimulation.'' In the studies of decision making involving monetary gambles, reference level is sometimes defined as a zero point where individuals feel no gain or no loss, i.e., the status quo (Luce, Mellers, 6 Chang, 1993 ), or as an aspiration level (Lopes, 1987) reflecting needs and opportunities in the current context. In experiments, it is often operationally defined either by the gamble's expected monetary value (Loomes 6 Sugden, 1986) or by a monetary value established by experimenters (Payne, Laughhunn, 6 Crum, 1980) . Experiments using monetary outcomes have shown marked differences in risky choices when outcomes are seen as gains (usually risk averse choices) or losses (usually risk prone choices). Health risk-taking contexts might show a similar marked difference in risk attitudes depending upon whether outcomes are seen as gains or losses by decision-makers compared with their reference level. The health risk-taking context arena should be a fruitful area for future efforts to model the reference level because (1) the context is richer than in simple monetary gambles and (2) the tradition of longitudinal studies provides a mechanism for empirical observations of changes in reference level over time.
Defining reference level is more complicated in health risk-taking decisions than in the studies of decision making with monetary gambles because each individual experiences different health states and social contexts over time. Defining reference level becomes even more difficult when multiple attributes are involved rather than a single attribute. Following Helson, we define the``health risk-taking reference level'' to be the internal norms representing the pooled effects of past, current, and expected future health states which affect decisions related to health risk-taking behaviors.
A person's current state in comparison with the past is one factor that can affect his or her reference level which then can affect the current satisfaction. Hsee and Abelson (1991) found that outcome satisfaction changes as a function of actual outcome and degree of change over time. For example, suppose a sexually active and healthy teenager contracts a minor STD. This teenager may feel he or she is in a very bad state (in the loss domain). But another teenager, who has been hospitalized until recently with hepatitis, may feel that contracting a minor STD is a much better health state (in the gain domain) relative to his or her recent experience. Reference level can also be affected by a person's expectations about the future. A sick person, who expected that he or she would be better in the near future, but does not improve, may feel that the health condition is getting worse rather than simply staying the same. The relative impact of these factors on reference level can vary. During very painful medical tests, Redelmeier 6 Kahneman (1996) found that the greatest pain and the pain at the end of the test period were sufficient factors to model a patient's overall judgment of pain. More detailed models could be constructed of such factors which would include changes in the factors in response to reference levels.
Next, we describe a real medical health incident to illustrate how an individual's reference level can be affected by the change of health states over time and we show a simple way of labeling the reference level to capture some of the richness of the real-life situation. There is little research yet on how to model the reference level and the change of it over time, even for well-studied monetary outcomes. This case contains health outcomes and the approach generated here for defining and tracking reference levels suggests the complexities that will be needed to extend decision models to include reference levels for health risk-taking behaviors.
A real case (of pneumonia). While writing this paper, the second author (Keller) contracted pneumonia. At the beginning of the week, Keller thought she had gotten over a cold with a nagging cough and planned a full work week, but instead came down with pneumonia. She hoped to recover quickly by taking antibiotics and to resume her duties. However, as her condition worsened, she adjusted her reference level several times based on two factors: the current health state (C) and the expected value (E) of future states.
On the third day following the onset of pneumonia, her reference level R 3 was determine by two factors, R 3 =(C 3 , E 3 ). The current health state C 3 was (no sleep for 3 days, breathlessness, coughing, and fever), and the expected value of future states E 3 was (expected there was a fair chance the fever would break and she would be fine in one day, expected that she would not be able to attend any part of the by now one-third completed Bayesian Research Conference, but she would be able to try to teach the MBA module that weekend). Based on this reference level, she took a health risk and decided to get out of bed and work on completing her lecture.
On day 4, she adjusted her reference level to C 4 =(no sleep for 4 days, breathlessness, coughing, and fever), and E 4 =(expected there was a fair chance the fever would break and she would be fine in one day). Based on this reference level, she decided not to teach the MBA module. By day 6, her reference level was adjusted to C 6 =(no sleep for 6 days, breathlessness, coughing, only a low-level fever), and E 6 =(expected there was a high chance for admission to the hospital). Based on this reference level, she stopped focusing on the short-term tasks of completing work and decided to seek medical treatment. She spent days 7, 8, and 9 in the hospital, with rapidly improving health and growing acceptance of the coming month-long recuperation period. She now had a longer term focus on gaining back her health.
At the same time that Keller's reference level was changing daily, her husband and family were also undergoing rapid changes in reference levels, required decision situations, and roles. There was great concern about the likelihood that Keller's illness would alter the health of Keller's visiting father. (It turned out that he caught Keller's original cold, but did not develop pneumonia.) Keller's husband faced the challenge of maintaining his own life along with extra tasks, worries, and factors added on above that. His reference level was changing over time with continually increasing tasks, stress, and concern.
Other Possible Extensions to Models to Include Temporal Changes
This example shows that the roller coaster of changing perceptions and physical states can lead to drastic changes in reference level. In addition to the complexities in defining reference level, two additional features are important for models of health risk-taking contexts: (1) actions, opinions, and states of other stakeholders influence the focal decision maker over time, and (2) the decision process (as represented by the model's aggregation rule) may shift rapidly, such as from a short-term perspective to a long-term perspective.
Other stakeholders. Social context affects individuals' perceptions of risks or the evaluation of their health outcomes. In risky sexual behavior or alcohol use, for example, the perspectives, roles, and actions of partners, friends, and caregivers may be highly influential. The fact that``everyone else'' smokes may have a significant dampening impact on an adolescent's judgment about the probable adverse effects of smoking on future health. Conversely, nonsmoking adolescents' ratings of the maturity and glamour of a peer who smokes can be lowered by antismoking advertising messages (Pechmann 6 Ratneshwar, 1994) .
It is a challenge to adequately expand models of risk-taking behavior to incorporate the change of reference level due to interactions among multiple stakeholders over time, such as actions and opinions of potential sexual partners and their parents. Even for chronic illnesses, interactions with stakeholders can have substantial changing effects over time. For example, Chestnut, Keller, Lambert, 6 Rowe (1996) found that some heart disease patients felt that worry for family members was a major concern as the disease progressed, but that feelings of regret for not being able to contribute to society through paid work abated over time. In the pneumonia case, Keller's visiting father's health and her husband's increased tasks and worries increased her concern about the current situation and possible future lasting impacts. Decision analysis research has developed some models for incorporating information on distributions of health and safety risks and benefits among people (such as in Keller 6 Sarin, 1988) . Such models focus on the fairness of distributions, but they may provide insights for ways of tracking multiple stakeholders' states in comparison with a focal individual even when fairness is not an issue.
Rapid shifts in decision process. It may be that a person switches between two operating modes when there is a large shift in reference level. Such a switch may need to be modeled with different aggregation rules. One rule might frame the situation as a repeated game, while another might frame it with a narrow focus as a oneshot gamble with either a resulting gain or loss (with respect to the current reference level).
In addition, many health risk-taking actions become day-to-day habits over long periods of time (such as drinking alcohol or smoking marijuana) and are unlikely therefore to be perceived as formal decisions (Keller 6 Lambert, 1987) . However, when the situation shifts rapidly, such as when a young unmarried woman becomes pregnant, then many explicit decisions will be faced.
DISCUSSION
This paper reviewed several applications of a decision-making perspective in studying health risk-taking behaviors and posed challenges in constructing a rich but unifying framework for modeling decisions involving health risk-taking.
One application of a decision-making perspective has focused on investigating the individual components of overall utility. Although most of these studies focused on finding individual differences in each of the components of overall utility and did not study the effect of utility on actual behaviors, this approach opens a way to understand the underlying mechanism for taking risks. Another application investigated the validity of the basic combination rules of subjective expected utility and the theory of reasoned action in predicting future risk-taking behaviors.
Future models of risk-taking behaviors might be able to predict actual risktaking behaviors more accurately by incorporating other key factors such as past behavior associated with health risk-taking. Furthermore, more research is necessary to investigate the challenges inherent in modeling risk-taking under a utility framework. These include investigation of the best way (i) to deal with large numbers of attributes, (ii) to elicit components of overall utility, and (iii) to incorporate preference changes over time.
There are three streams of work not covered in this paper which will provide added potential expansions of the study of health risk-taking. First, our discussion has not covered all the factors that need to be examined. For example, emotions such as fear and shock may affect risk-taking (Averill, 1987) . Also, the factors that we considered in this paper may interact with each other in complex ways. For example, past experience may affect both self-efficacy and reference level, and selfefficacy may affect reference level.
Second, although the study of possible judgmental biases in making decisions has received extensive attention (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, 6 Tversky, 1982) , this tradition has not been frequently applied in studying risk-taking behaviors. As an exception, Linville, Fischer, 6 Fischhoff (1993) found that subjects fail to recognize that even if the risk of contracting HIV from each unprotected sexual encounter is small, the cumulative risks from a series of unprotected encounters will be large. Thus, subjects significantly underestimated the cumulative risks compared to those calculated from a binomial probability model. An uninvestigated example of possible cognitive bias is that many actions related to risk-taking involve the choice to engage in a specific behavior or not, rather than a choice among several alternatives (Weinstein, 1993) . Thus, it is possible that the decision between taking a risky action or not might be qualitatively different from choosing one option among several alternatives. Some relevant research on this possibility can be found in the study of physician decisions. For example, Redelmeier 6 Shafir (1995) studied the effect of multiple options on physicians' prescriptions. In one scenario involving a patient with osteoarthritis, they found that family physicians were less likely to prescribe a medication when deciding between two medications than deciding about only one medication. Thus, the availability of an additional medication led physicians not to recommend any prescriptions. Similar effects may occur in risktaking behaviors. Further research is necessary to locate the biases and to investigate the source of such biases and how best to incorporate them in modeling health decisions. Understanding the mechanisms of such cognitive biases may also lead to improved decision making in complex medical decisions.
Finally, little work has been done to examine the effect of computerized decision aids on health-related decision processes. One notable study by Bosworth, Gustafson, 6 Hawkins (1994) created and tested the Body Awareness Resource Network (BARN), a computer-assisted health promotion system for adolescents. It provided information and skill-building techniques related to AIDS, alcohol and other drug use, body management, human sexuality, smoking, and stress management. Follow-up evaluation after 2 years showed that users of BARN were less likely to engage in risky behaviors than nonusers. However, use of BARN was unrelated to initiation of sexual activity, stress prevention, or onset of any substance use.
Everyone makes decisions about whether to engage in risky behaviors and the subsequent impacts on health can be serious. As repeatedly emphasized throughout the paper, health risk-taking is an enormously complex process and thus modeling these decisions is a challenging task. However, establishing models that accurately represent the causes of and processes underlying risk-taking behaviors for both individuals and society will provide a framework for a better approach to understand and handle the problems.
